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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the essential characteristics of the financial statements of FinTech 
start-ups and to investigate which figures of balance sheets are suitable indicators of failure for this still 
rising group of start-ups. We conduct a quantitative analysis of 595 annual reports of FinTech start-ups 
issued between 2007 and 2016. Our study reveals that the balance sheets have a high share of current 
assets and often show losses not covered by equity. Based on the financial variables, the period of three 
to five years after foundation could be identified as critical phase for the future survival of FinTech start-
ups. Two years before failure significant changes in some balance sheet figures are recognizable. Using a 
logistic regression model, we identify accounting figures serving as indicators for the separation of the two 
groups, active and failed FinTech start-ups.    
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I. Introduction 
FinTech is a young phenomenon, which can especially be observed since the 
financial crisis in 2007-2008. This FinTech development is mainly being led by start-ups, 
which are combining technological possibilities with the products and services of the 
financial industry (Arner, Barberis, & Buckey, 2017). But literature on this topic is rare 
due to the young age of FinTech development. Previous research contributions and 
studies show that the market for FinTech companies can be subdivided into different 
business areas, of which the area of payment is identified as the most prominent one. 
Other known areas include investment/asset management (e.g. Greenvesting Solutions), 
acting as an intermediary for insurance or other financial products like loans (e.g. smava), 
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or data management (e.g. moneymeets) (Stuckenborg, Klein, & Leker, 2017; Winnefeld 
& Permantier, 2017). With the rising number of FinTech start-ups, traditional providers 
of the financial industry, such as banks and insurance companies, are increasingly being 
compelled to react to this recent development. In their early phase, FinTech start-ups 
were partly perceived as a threat or a temporary phenomenon by these traditional 
providers; however, the interaction between the new and established market participants 
has changed over time (Kiem, Potel, Trillmich, & Weir, 2016; Temelkov, 2018). The 
growing recognition of the FinTech area is evidenced by the rising number of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) in this sector by established companies of the financial industry. 
According to a study by the auditing company KPMG, the number of M&A deals in the 
FinTech domain grew from approximately 190 to 305 worldwide between 2012 and 2016 
(KPMG, 2017). Furthermore, there is increasing willingness to cooperate between 
FinTech companies and traditional providers. More and more banks and insurance 
companies are cooperating with FinTechs or have founded so-called “labs” or “hubs” 
(Swisscom, 2017) to identify market or product solutions together with the start-ups and 
to facilitate mutual learning. According to a recent study, approximately 70% of the 
financial institutions in Germany are cooperating with FinTech start-ups (Kashyap, 
Shipman, Garfinkel, Davies, & Nicolacakis, 2017). Apart from the traditional providers 
of the financial industry, the FinTech sector is also highly interesting for investors. Both 
the amount of investment and the number of completed deals in the FinTech domain 
have risen. The investment volume in Germany has grown from 10 million Euro 
(number of deals: nine) in 2012 to 400 million Euro (number of deals: 57) in 2017 (Ernst 
and Young, 2017). In order to identify potential acquisition or investment objects among 
the large and steadily growing number of FinTech companies, external stakeholders rely 
on evaluation methods. Furthermore, FinTech start-ups have increasingly become in the 
focus of scientific studies evaluating the phenomenon of FinTech and its development. 
The number of scientific publications dealing with this topic has undergone a rise of 
around 3,100% in the last five years.1 These previous research contributions mainly focus 
on the classification and definition of the market, on separating segments of the FinTech 
sector, on calculations of systematization criteria, and on regulatory issues (Brummer & 
Gorfine, 2014; Gulamhuseinwala, Bull, & Lewis, 2015; Zavolokina, Dolata, & Schwabe, 
2016). For instance, Stuckenborg et al. (2017) divide the FinTech market into segments 
and evaluate the business model patterns and revenue models with which FinTechs enter 
the market. 
 
 
 
1 Based on Google Scholar (2018), a search engine for scientific documentation, the number of search results has 
increased from 138 in 2012 to 4,420 in 2017. 
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For all these identified stakeholder groups, one question is of high interest: How 
can FinTech start-ups with good market prospects be identified among the large number 
of new players in the financial sector and which of these have a higher probability of 
failure? To identify those FinTech start-ups that have the potential to establish 
themselves on the market, some suitable evaluation criteria are needed. Other studies, 
such as those investigating established companies, use annual accounts, which are 
available to third parties and which allow an assessment of the financial situation of the 
valuation object (Baetge, 1998, p. 9). In contrast to established firms, the financial data 
available for start-ups is limited due to their relatively young age and we could not 
identify any contribution which investigates annual accounts of FinTech start-ups. This 
non-availability does not merely result from the short period of market activity, but also 
due to limited disclosure obligations of small businesses. Depending on the accounting 
standard, there are certain legal relaxations regarding the publication obligations – for 
instance, according to the German Accounting Standards (hereinafter HGB), the 
disclosure of profit-and-loss statement is not needed for companies belonging to the size 
category of small enterprises in keeping with § 267 Para. 1-3 HGB2. Most FinTech start-
ups can be assigned to this category. Furthermore, start-ups are typically not-publicly 
traded companies; hence, there is no permanent indicator about the current market value 
of a company available (Maeschle, 2012). In contrast, large firms have to publish a lot of 
(financial) information, which can be used as a basis for valuation (Gregory, Rutherford, 
Oswald, & Gardiner, 2005). 
Thus, on the one hand, limited financial data are available for the valuation of 
start-ups, while on the other hand, external stakeholders like investors need meaningful 
information to assess the future development of a start-up and to avoid losses, for 
instance through the insolvency of a supported company (Maeschle, 2012). The risk of 
total failure for investors is quite high, considering the failure rate of start-ups (D'Avino, 
Simone, Iannucci, & Schiraldi, 2015). With the rising number of FinTech start-ups in the 
market, the share of start-ups ceasing their business has increased as well. The probability 
of failure of start-ups in the first six years in Germany is about 45.5% across all industries 
(Diehm, 2014, p. 262). Also, several start-ups in the FinTech sector have given up their 
business activities, such as “Cashboard” and “Outbank” (Raeth, 2017; Wolff, 2017). This 
higher failure risk in the start-up environment can be ascribed to various factors. Due to 
the short history of start-ups and a heavily dynamic market environment, company 
structures have to be established. At the same time, strategic decisions have to be 
permanently revaluated in the first few years. Moreover, start-ups have restricted 
 
 
 
2 The size category of small enterprises is defined on the following criteria: balance sheet total per year ≤ 6 million 
Euro, revenues per year ≤ 12 million Euro and an average number of employees ≤ 50. 
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resources in the beginning, which affects both staff and financial endowment. However, 
high investments are simultaneously needed to tap new market segments and build up 
the company. In consequence, high initial losses are recorded at the beginning, since the 
required investments are mostly not offset by high revenues (Diehm, 2014, pp. 21–25). 
Therefore, start-ups usually depend on external investors like banks and other investors 
(Thornton-Trump & Fu, 2000). But unlike in the case of large firms, lenders like 
commercial banks demand high costs of capital due to the uncertainty of the start-up’s 
future prospects. Thus, start-ups are usually obliged to fall back on venture capitalists, 
own capital, or short-term debt (Berger & Udell, 1998; Gregory et al., 2005). There are 
also new forms of entrepreneurial finance available that could provide a solution to the 
financing problem, such as crowdfunding (Wright, Lumpkin, Zott, & Agarwal, 2016). 
Generally, the environment of start-ups, especially in the FinTech sector as a very young 
market segment, is characterized by high growth and strong dynamics (Dorfleitner, 
Hornuf, Schmitt, & Weber, 2017, p. 1). Against the backdrop of scant resource 
availability, high flexibility and a rapid growth rate are necessary in order to remain in the 
market (Diehm, 2014, pp. 21–25). Some start-ups cannot survive in such dynamic market 
conditions and are forced to give up their business. Such a negative development 
becomes apparent ahead of time (Duvivier, 2000). Corporate crises have several stages 
and are reflected in the key financial figures of the company. The investigation of balance 
sheets to examine the risk profile of a company is widely discussed in literature because 
this method lets external stakeholders gain a meaningful insight into the financial 
situation (Maeschle, 2012).  
This risk of failure for FinTechs is addressed in this study by evaluating the 
balance sheet data of these young companies. Several empirical studies use balance sheet 
data to analyze the failure probability of firms. Such contributions often focus on large 
and established firms, for which a large amount of financial data are available.3 But the 
literature concerning the effects of balance sheet data on the survival prospects of start-
ups is quite rare (D'Avino et al., 2015; Duvivier, 2000; Gaskill, van Auken, & Manning, 
1993; Gregory et al., 2005; Huynh, Petrunia, & Voia, 2010; Marom & Lussier, 2014; 
Thornton-Trump & Fu, 2000). Considering the limitations of individual studies, it can 
be concluded that existing contributions consider only individual balance sheet items and 
no investigation of the complete annual accounts takes place (D'Avino et al., 2015; 
Duvivier, 2000; Gregory et al., 2005; Thornton-Trump & Fu, 2000). Furthermore, these 
studies concentrate on the different financing options of start-ups and try to evaluate the 
implications of different sources of funding on the survival prospects (Duvivier, 2000; 
 
 
 
3 For an overview of studies regarding the prediction of failure probability, see Altman and Narayanan (1997), Altman 
and Saunders (1997), and Zavgren (1985). 
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Gregory et al., 2005). In addition, existing studies often focus on individual start-ups or 
only have a one-year review period. For instance, Huynh et al. (2010) investigate the 
effect of the initial financial conditions on the failure rate of start-ups and consider only 
the first year after founding. In their case study of an Italian start-up, D'Avino et al. 
(2015) use selected balance sheet items regarding only one business year. In contributions 
like Marom and Lussier (2014) as well as Gregory et al. (2005), the sample consists not 
only of start-ups, but medium-sized companies are also included in the analysis.  
Based on the limitations of these existing contributions, there is a research gap 
to investigate which accounting differences exist between active and failed start-ups 
regarding the complete balance sheet data of a sample of start-ups over an extended 
period of years. In addition, we could not identify any contribution which investigates 
special characteristics of start-up balance sheets over time. To address this research gap, 
the purpose of this paper is to examine the essential features of start-up balance sheets 
regarding the exemplary group of FinTech start-ups using 595 balance sheets over a 
period of 10 years (2007–2016). Moreover, we aim to evaluate those balance sheet items 
which are suitable indicators of failure and allow conclusions on the failure probability 
of start-ups. Overall, we address the following research questions: What are the main 
characteristics of the balance sheets of FinTech start-ups and can any patterns be 
identified? Which accounting indicators of balance sheets can be used for predicting the 
probability of failure?  
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by providing one of the first 
empirical investigations of balance sheets of FinTech start-ups and possible failure 
indicators based on financial data. Our analyses reveal that the balance sheets of FinTech 
start-ups are often marked by a high share of current assets, debt intensity, and frequent 
losses not covered by equity, especially in the initial years. The period of three to five 
years after foundation is identified as critical regarding the future survival prospects of 
FinTech companies. Differences between the groups of active and failed FinTechs are 
mainly observed in the balance sheet items of fixed assets, equity, cash, and debt capital. 
Furthermore, the results of the logistic regression show that the probability of failure 
decreases with a higher share of seven balance sheet items. 
To address these research questions, the rest of this paper is organized as follows: 
First, we outline the legal framework regarding the annual reports of FinTech companies. 
Next, we illustrate the methodological approach as well as the process of data collection 
and adjustments. Afterward, the results of the empirical analysis are presented. In the 
concluding section, limitations to be considered in the interpretation of the results are 
shown along with implications for practice and theory. Finally, the results are 
summarized and discussed. 
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II. Legal framework 
Since the FinTech development is a relatively young phenomenon and most 
FinTech start-ups were founded only recently, the availability of annual financial data is 
related to restrictions. Concurrently, there are certain legal conditions that have a strong 
influence on the availability of annual financial data, in particular due to the company 
size of start-ups. For this reason, the relevant legal aspects with regard to start-ups are 
briefly explained in this section. In accordance with § 267 HGB, corporations are to be 
assigned to different size categories, which form the basis for the definition of rights and 
obligations concerning the extent and type of the company’s reporting as well as the 
audit and disclosure of the annual accounts. In § 267 Para. 1-3 HGB, three size categories 
are defined - small, medium, and large. Of these, small companies include a subset – 
micro-enterprises (§ 267a HGB). The classification criteria for the individual categories 
are total assets, revenues, and the number of employees (Table 1), of which at least two 
parameters have to fall below or exceed the criterion threshold on two consecutive 
reporting dates in order to be assigned to another size category (§§ 267, 267a HGB). In 
case of newly founded companies, the assignment is done on the basis of the first 
reporting date (§ 267 Para. 4 HGB). FinTech start-ups are mostly classified as micro-
enterprises or small companies and thus have certain relaxations in terms of financial 
reporting. 
 
Table 1: Criteria of the size categories 
 Micro- 
enterprises 
Small 
enterprises 
Medium 
enterprises 
Balance sheet total ≤ 350,000 Euro ≤ 6,000,000 Euro ≤ 20,000,000 Euro 
Revenues ≤ 700,000 Euro ≤ 12,000,000 Euro ≤ 40,000,000 Euro 
Average number of 
employees in a year  
≤ 10 Employees ≤ 50 Employees ≤ 250 Employees 
Source: § 267 Para. 1 and § 267a Para. 1 HGB 
 
In general, every company is obligated to prepare its balance sheet and profit-
and-loss accounts at the end of each year, according to § 242 Para. 1-2 HGB. Moreover, 
in accordance with § 264 HGB, there is an obligation to complement the annual account 
with an appendix and to prepare a situation report. However, there are certain relaxations 
of these regulations depending on the respective size category. In the following section, 
the disclosure obligations for micro- and small companies in particular are briefly 
discussed. 
 
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance    Volume 21   Issue 1     2019   
 
 
63 
Extent of the reporting. Regarding the extent of the financial data to be disclosed, 
micro-companies have the option to limit their balance sheet by only considering the 
first structure level, in accordance with § 266 Para. 1 Sent. 1 HGB. Small companies, 
however, have to consider the second structure level as well. Both micro- and small 
companies are exempt from the obligations to disclose deferred taxes (§ 274a HGB) and 
to prepare a situation report in accordance with § 264 Para. 1 Sent. 4 HGB. Moreover, 
profit-and-loss accounts need not be published (§ 326 Para. 1 HGB). Micro-companies 
have no obligation to complement the annual account with an appendix, according to § 
264 Para. 1 Sent. 5 HGB, provided certain information is included in the balance sheet. 
In terms of the balance sheet, there are no relaxations for medium and large companies. 
Only certain information in the appendix may be omitted. While investigating the annual 
accounts of FinTechs, it should be noted that the relevant balance sheets contain data 
up to only the second level of detail. 
Place and period of disclosure. While the annual account generally has to be published 
in the Federal Gazette, there is a separate regulation for micro-companies. For 
companies belonging to this size category, it is sufficient to submit the balance sheet to 
the Federal Gazette for permanent deposit, according to § 326 Para. 2 HGB. Third 
parties can access these financial statements subject to a charge. In accordance with § 
325 Para. 1a HGB, the annual account has to be submitted within one year of the 
reporting date of the corresponding business year. 
Auditing duty. In accordance with § 316 Para. 1 Sent. 1 HGB, micro- and small 
companies are exempt from annual auditing duty. Apart from these obligations 
concerning the publication of the annual report, there is another special characteristic, 
as coded in § 264 Para. 3-4 and § 264b HGB, which has to be considered while gathering 
the annual accounts of FinTech start-ups. According to this regulation, subsidiaries 
included in a consolidated financial statement need not publish their individual financial 
statement. For example, the FinTech start-up “mr. Commerce GmbH,” being a 
subsidiary of the “net group Beteiligungen GmbH & Co. KG,” does not publish any 
individual financial statement because it is included in the consolidated financial 
statement of the concern.4 
From these legal frameworks, the following implications arise for the 
examination carried out in this study. The annual accounts of FinTech start-ups, 
particularly of micro- and small companies, are not necessarily publicly accessible in the 
Federal Gazette. In the case of micro-companies, the annual accounts are deposited with 
the official Business Register. Furthermore, in most cases, the annual accounts do not 
 
 
 
4 According to the announcement of “mr. Commerce GmbH” on January 2, 2017 in Federal Gazette (2017). 
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include profit-and-loss accounts or an appendix. Another restriction is the extent of the 
balance sheet, which needs to be up to the second structure level only. 
 
III. Methodological framework and data sample 
A. Methodology 
1. Balance sheet analysis 
For the investigations in this study, a balance sheet analysis of FinTech start-ups 
is conducted. Basically, a balance sheet analysis involves the preparation (compression) 
and evaluation of insight-targeted business information using key figures, systems of 
figures, and other methods (Kueting & Weber, 2015, p. 1). The objective of a balance 
sheet analysis is to assess the economic situation of companies on the basis of annual 
accounts (Barth, Barth, Nassadil, & Werner, 2014, p. 17). Balance sheet analyses are of 
two types – qualitative and quantitative. In quantitative balance sheet analyses, the focus 
is on the figures of the annual accounts, which, for instance, are condensed by creating 
accounting indicators, so that the financial situation of the company can be more 
accurately assessed. Qualitative balance sheet analyses evaluate verbal reports like the 
appendix, management report, etc. Here, the focus can be, for example, semantical 
analyses or modifications in exercising of accounting options (Kueting & Weber, 2015, 
pp. 14, 414). Since no knowledge about qualitative aspects, such as the quality of the 
management or the employees, is available in the case of FinTech start-ups, these aspects 
are not considered. Therefore, a quantitative balance sheet analysis is selected in this 
study as the analytical framework. Another differentiation lies in the perspective of the 
balance analyses – internal or external. Since the investigations reported in this study are 
based on publicly available information, an external balance sheet analysis is applied. In 
the context of the external balance sheet analyses, individual analyses, time-based 
comparisons, and intercompany comparisons are possible (Krueger, 2014, pp. 8–9; 
Nicolini, 2008, p. 75).  
There are some restrictions related to the analysis of the annual financial data to 
be considered while evaluating and interpreting the results. Thus, it is a consideration of 
the past in a double sense – on the one hand, annual accounts refer to a previous business 
year and on the other hand, the financial statements are published after a certain period 
from the end of the business year in accordance with the legal publication obligations 
specified in the HGB. Furthermore, in annual accounts, accounting policies in relation 
to the exercise of certain accounting options can be used by the accounting company to 
influence the business figures (Krueger, 2014, pp. 4–5). Another restriction in the 
external balance sheet analysis is the incompleteness of the data, as only the publicly 
available information can be used for the investigation (Graefer & Schneider, 2010, p. 
10). 
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2. Multivariate analysis 
To evaluate the probability of failure, different methods can be employed in 
general. In recent years, insolvency research has primarily applied discriminant analyses, 
artificial neural networks, and logistic regressions. In the last decade, logistic regression 
analysis has prevailed (Fischer, 2012, p. 93)5; it is a suitable method for answering 
dichotomous questions such as those in our study (Ge & Whitmore, 2010). To address 
the second research question by identifying accounting variables having a statistically 
significant impact on the failure probability, we use a binary logistic regression model 
with the specification reported in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Model specification 
 
 
For this purpose, the dependent variable in our model represents the status 
whether a FinTech failed or is still active. As independent variables, the shares of each 
accounting item of the balance sheet scaled by the balance sheet total are included in our 
regression model. To consider further effects that may have an impact on the firm failure, 
we control for the activity period by measuring how many years the FinTech has 
operated in the market. Generally, there are different methods to process a logistic 
regression. In our investigation, we conduct a stepwise backward logistic regression to 
identify the most suitable model.  
 
 
 
5 Nowadays, logistic regression, which has some advantages over other methods like discriminant analysis, 
is used for the practical forecasting of insolvencies. Logistic regression is based on fewer assumptions and 
is more robust against outliers than discriminant analysis (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006, 
p. 368; Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, & Weiber, 2016, p. 287). 
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To interpret the results of the logistic regression in a suitable way, the 
independent variables should not be highly correlated with one another to avoid 
multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 443). For assessing the degree of 
multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is a suitable indicator (Lim, Ding, & 
Charoenwong, 2013). If the value of the VIF is clearly below ten for all variables, the 
requirement of absence of multicollinearity is fulfilled (Hair et al., 2006, p. 230). 
To assess the results of the logistic regression in terms of classification of the 
performance and separability of the two groups, the receiver operation characteristic 
(ROC) curve is a suitable valuation method, which is often used in ratings (Thomas, 
2009, p. 115). By presenting the sensitivity (assignment rate “negative control”) and 
specificity (assignment rate “false positive”) of the regression model, the classification 
performance can be displayed (Pospeschill, 2010, p. 195). For perfect separation, the 
ROC curve would consist of two straight lines (points 0;0 to 0;1 and 0;1 to 1;1); for an 
ineffective model, however, the ROC curve would form a 45° diagonal (Kuhn & 
Johnson, 2013, p. 264). As a quantitative measure, the area under the curve (AUC) can 
be determined, which serves as the value of separability of the model. The higher the 
deviation to 0.5 (no separability), the better the separability and classification 
performance of the model (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 301). 
 
B. Sample selection 
In order to address the research questions, an extensive database has been 
prepared with annual financial statements of FinTech start-ups. The database has been 
generated with the following restrictions: First, only FinTech start-ups with headquarters 
in Germany are considered. This geographical restriction was implemented due to two 
reasons: First, Germany is one of the fastest growing markets in the FinTech sector, as 
mentioned in former sections, and second, by considering only German FinTechs, 
differences in annual financial data due to country-specific accounting standards can be 
excluded (Anandarajan, Francis, Hasan, & John, 2011). In addition, only FinTech 
companies that have provided their annual account in accordance with the HGB have 
been included in order to avoid distortions in comparisons through accounting 
differences (Krueger, 2014, p. 4). Another restriction exists in the underlying definition 
of FinTech start-ups used in this study, especially regarding the field of activity. For 
instance, broker portals for real estate, like the start-up “Maklaro,” which are subsumed 
under the term FinTech by certain platforms, are excluded from our investigation. 
Moreover, multiple platforms list product offerings under the term FinTech start-up, 
which, however, are only one of several products of a corporation and not an 
independent company. Not only are these not a FinTech start-up according to our 
definition, the influence of such single products on the annual accounts cannot be 
determined. 
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For building a database with the explained restrictions, all German companies 
listed under the term FinTech by various sources were collected initially. These sources 
are Crunchbase (2017), PaymentandBanking (2017), and ZEB (2017) which are freely 
accessible on the internet. In this initial step, 396 FinTech start-ups could be gathered 
for our database. This number of FinTech start-ups also corresponds to the results of 
other studies about the German FinTech market (Dorfleitner et al., 2017, pp. 11–13). 
From this list, 146 start-ups were eliminated by applying the set restrictions. Among the 
146 eliminated from the database of 396 start-ups, 123 FinTech companies were 
excluded from the investigation because of non-conformity with the underlying 
definition of FinTech, while the remaining 23 were excluded because of the used 
accounting standard. After restriction-based elimination, a total of 250 FinTech start-ups 
remained on the list. Subsequently, general information, such as the date of foundation 
or the company name (full legal name) as listed in the Commercial Register, was collected 
for this sample of FinTech start-ups.6 In order to capture the balance sheets of all 
companies in a structured and similar form, a data acquisition scheme was set up 
following § 266 HGB; it contains the first, second, and third structure levels. For all 
FinTech start-ups included in the database, we examined whether the annual accounts 
are available by using both the Federal Gazette (2017) and the official Business Register 
(2017)7. While 595 annual accounts of 131 FinTech start-ups could be collected in total, 
the annual accounts of the remaining companies were not available or were incomplete. 
This can be attributed to several causes. First, many FinTechs are subsidiaries and hence 
mostly do not publish an individual financial statement but are included in the 
consolidated financial statement, as already pointed out. Second, the non-availability can 
be attributed to the disclosure deadlines. For example, annual accounts for start-ups 
founded in 2016/2017 could not be obtained at the date of investigation.  
The resulting sample of start-ups was finally checked to see, whether they are 
still actively represented in the market or have already given up their business activity. If 
a start-up has already been liquidated or declared insolvent through an official 
announcement, the status “failed” was assigned and the official failure date was 
recorded.8 In total, the dataset for our investigation comprises 595 annual accounts of 
131 FinTech start-ups in Germany. Of these, 22 start-ups have already failed, which 
implies a failure rate of 17%. The level of detail of the publications, especially concerning 
 
 
 
6 The founding information was approved on Commercial Register (2017). 
7 The business register was used for deposited annual accounts in the case of micro-entities as illustrated 
in the previous section. While the Federal Gazette and the Commercial register are freely accessible by 
third parties, the access to the business register for deposited annual accounts is fee-based per session. 
8 In addition, Insolvency Announcements (2017) was checked for official announcements. 
Stuckenborg & Leker - The survival of the German FinTech market 
 
68 68 
the extent of the balance sheet, is different for the 595 collected annual accounts. While 
some start-ups only fulfil the minimal requirements and publish the first structure level 
for all or certain years, other FinTech companies publish the second and, in part, the 
third structure level as well. Of the 595 gathered balance sheets, 469 include, apart from 
the first, also data of the second structure level, but usually only in a fragmented manner. 
Before the data were prepared for the balance sheet analysis, a plausibility check of the 
collected data was conducted to ensure that no transmission errors or inconsistent 
balance sheets would distort the results of the investigation. For this plausibility check, 
individual sums were formed and cross-checked for every individual balance sheet and 
its intermediate positions. 
 
C. Data adjustments 
In order to properly conduct an intercompany comparison, the collected data 
have to be standardized and made comparable. If accounting options are exercised 
differently in the annual accounts, for instance, this can lead to distortions and limitations 
in terms of comparability. For this reason, the data must be transferred to standardized 
balance sheets (Nicolini, 2008, p. 76). Such a standardized balance sheet is intended to 
contribute to an improvement of the comparability of annual accounts through the 
neutralization of the accounting policy measures applied (Kueting & Weber, 2015, p. 83). 
When preparing a standardized balance sheet, individual items of the original annual 
account are netted (for example, offset with other fields), revaluated, or reclassified. After 
this, the individual balance sheet items of the asset side are summarized under fixed and 
current assets, while the items of the equity and liability side are summarized under equity 
and debt capital (Kueting & Weber, 2015, p. 81). Finally, all balance sheet items are 
assigned to two upper fields on each balance sheet side, thus providing the basis for 
further analyses and enabling a suitable intercompany comparison. In the following 
section, the modifications of the individual items of the annual accounts of the FinTech 
start-ups that are netted and reclassified within this preparation process are presented in 
brief. 
Outstanding deposits on subscribed capital. If the subscribed capital has not been fully 
paid up yet, the remaining amount must be declared in the balance sheet. In accordance 
with § 272 Para. 1 HGB, there is a right to choose between the net and gross method 
for the statement of outstanding, unclaimed deposits. In the net method, the outstanding 
deposits are shown as a special item above the assets on the asset side. In the gross 
method, however, these deposits are deducted from the subscribed capital (Baetge, 1998, 
p. 91). If the gross method is used, the subscribed capital has to be reduced by this 
amount (Lachnit & Mueller, 2017, p. 21). Since such a deduction from the subscribed 
capital is already carried out in the net method, no change in the standardized balance 
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sheet is required. This field is relatively common in the considered balance sheets, since 
the objects of investigation in this study are relatively young companies.  
Prepaid expenses/Deferred income. Since there are only two upper fields on each side 
of the standardized balance sheet, the prepaid expenses field has to be reclassified. In 
general, prepaid expenses are recognized in order to achieve a period-appropriate 
distribution of assets (Nicolini, 2008, p. 86). However, even in accordance with the HGB, 
this field does not represent an asset itself and from a business point of view, its 
characteristics are similar to that of receivables (Broesel, 2017, p. 186). Thus, for the 
purpose of a balance sheet analysis, prepaid expenses have to be reclassified as current 
assets. Similarly, the deferred income has to be reclassified as debt capital (Rheinboldt, 
1998, p. 119).  
Deferred tax assets and liabilities. Under § 274 HGB, there is an option granted for 
the valuation of the deferred tax assets in the balance sheet, while the deferred tax 
liabilities have to be valued. Different approaches are presented in the literature regarding 
the handling of deferred taxes while preparing a standardized balance sheet. While 
Lachnit and Mueller (2017, p. 22) suggest that deferred tax assets should be reclassified 
as current assets and deferred tax liabilities as debt capital, there is another approach that 
involves netting out the two fields. If an asset surplus arises, this should be offset against 
equity, while a surplus of liabilities should be reclassified as debt capital (Kueting & 
Weber, 2015, 92). In this study, we select the approach of netting out because this 
method is widespread and well-accepted in literature; moreover, better comparability is 
ensured because of the elimination of optional capitalization influences (Broesel, 2017, 
p. 129).  
Losses not covered by equity. Another field that is particularly common in the area of 
start-ups is “losses not covered by equity.” If companies cannot show shareholders’ 
equity in their balance sheet, an appropriate field on the asset side has to be disclosed, in 
accordance with § 268 Para. 3 HGB. This is neither an asset nor an accounting 
convenience; rather, it is a correction value to avoid the disclosure of negative equity 
(Kueting & Weber, 2015, pp. 142–143; Theile, 2017, p. 71). While preparing a 
standardized balance sheet, such a field is handled as follows: Since it would lead to 
distortions on the asset side and this field implies negative shareholders’ equity from a 
business point of view, a reclassification should be done with negative sign in the equity 
(Broesel, 2017, p. 124; Lachnit & Mueller, 2017, p. 22). In consequence, the shareholders’ 
equity could be negative in the considered standardized balance sheets. 
Special reserves with an equity portion. Special reserves with an equity portion, arising 
as a result of special depreciations, for instance, are a kind of mixed field containing a 
tax component that is uncertain in terms of the amount (character of a provision) 
(Nicolini, 2008, p. 89). For a standardized balance sheet, this “special reserves” field shall 
be divided into the equity and the debt capital. A 50% apportionment of the two 
components is recommended (Baetge, 1998, p. 148).  
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Table 2: Standardized balance sheet: Results of the data adjustments 
Assets  Equity and liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 
 
Fixed assets  
Intangible assets 
Tangible assets 
Financial assets 
 
Current assets  
Inventories 
Accounts receivable 
Securities  
Cash  
Prepaid expenses  
Other assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Equity  
Subscribed capital  
Capital reserves  
Retained earnings  
Net income/(loss) carry forward (c.f.) 
Net income/(loss) 
Outstanding deposits on subscribed capital  
If applicable, overhang of deferred tax assets  
Losses not covered by equity 
50% of the special reserve items  
 
Debt Capital 
Provisions 
Liabilities  
Thereof: Current Liabilities 
Deferred income  
If applicable, overhang of deferred tax liabilities  
50% of the special reserve items  
 
Total assets Total equity and liabilities 
Notes: Corrections resulting from the processing measures are highlighted in grey. Additionally, the signs (+) and (-) 
indicate whether the concerned balance sheet items are to be added or deducted. 
 
Further adjustments and processing measures have to be carried out, especially 
if comparability is to be maintained between annual accounts that are prepared according 
to different accounting standards, such as the HGB and the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Thus, for instance, self-created intangible assets (with 
capitalization prohibition according to the HGB and capitalization obligation according 
to the IFRS) have to be unified in the standardized balance sheet (Nicolini, 2008, p. 91). 
Since the balance sheets in our database are all prepared according to the HGB, such 
pruning measures can be omitted. Table 2 shows the final standardized balance sheet 
format, including the pruning measures conducted. 
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IV. Empirical results 
A. Summary statistics 
On the whole, our sample comprises 595 annual accounts of 131 FinTech start-
ups. All annual accounts contain the first level of balance sheet fields, while the second 
level is partially available for 469 financial statements.9 Most of the gathered annual 
accounts (61%) pertain to the first three years after foundation (Table 3). With increasing 
business years, the number of available balance sheets declines. Thus, the period from 
the sixth year is reflected by around 14% of the annual accounts. There are only two 
annual accounts in the database for the year ten after foundation; thus, these years are 
excluded from further consideration due to the small number of observations. 
 
Table 3: Number of balance sheets in the sample (by years after foundation) 
 Years after foundation 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 
No. of balance  
sheets in the sample 
131 123 110 90 57 37 23 12 10 2 
 
Regarding the different legal forms contained in our sample (Table 4), the form 
of the limited liability corporation (GmbH), at 86%, is the predominant and most 
frequently used one. The German “Unternehmergesellschaft (UG),”10 an entrepreneurial 
company as a precursor of the limited liability corporation, is represented in our database 
by two FinTech start-ups. Especially in the area of start-ups, the launch of the business 
is often related with a so-called UG due to the low level of required initial share capital. 
However, this is converted into a limited liability corporation relatively quickly. The 
shares of limited liability partnerships (GmbH & Co. KG), at 3%, and of stock 
corporations (AG), at 9%, are relatively small, so these legal forms are rather rare in the 
area of start-ups. FinTech start-ups with the legal form of stock corporations are, for 
example, the “Exporo AG,” “Vaamo Finanz AG,” and the “Vexcash AG.” Classification 
into size categories following the presented legal terms concerning the publication 
obligations can only be carried out on the basis of the criterion of the balance sheet total, 
 
 
 
9 The second structure level of the fields liabilities and provisions is generally not available. 
10 The initial share capital which has to be deposited in the founding process of an UG is a minimum of 
one Euro. In the following business years, a share of the generated revenues has to be deposited in the 
share capital up to an amount of 25,000 Euro (the minimum share capital of a limited liability corporation). 
On reaching this amount, the UG is converted into a limited liability corporation. 
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since data on revenues or employees per fiscal year are not available. Of the annual 
accounts, 95% belong to the category of micro- or small companies. This results in the 
aforementioned restrictions in relation to the published data, which can be used for the 
investigation. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of legal forms and size categories 
  Size categories according to the balance sheet total 
Legal Form 
Number of 
FinTechs 
Micro-  
enterprises 
Small  
enterprises 
Medium  
enterprises 
Large  
enterprises 
GmbH 113 336 156 19 5 
GmbH & Co. 
KG 
4 12 10 0 0 
UG 2 5 0 0 0 
AG 12 13 34 3 0 
∑ 131 366 200 22 5 
 
To evaluate the values of the balance sheet items of FinTech start-ups, Table 5 
shows the descriptive statistics of our sample, containing 25 variables. Basically, the 
financial statements of FinTech start-ups are characterized by a high intensity of current 
assets as well as debt capital. On the asset side, financial assets and inventories are not issued 
by the majority of FinTech start-ups. Since FinTech companies are mainly service-
intensive companies, this is comprehensible with regard to the inventories field. Financial 
assets play a subordinate role in the first few years. The high intensity of current assets can 
mainly be traced to a high share of accounts receivable and cash. 
On the equity and liability side, a high level of debt capital intensity is generally 
observed, which is attributable to a high proportion of liabilities, of which a large 
proportion is short-term in nature. This finding corresponds with other studies, 
according to which start-ups are often obliged to borrow in the short term, because long-
term debts are usually not granted due to the uncertainty of their future prospects 
(Gregory et al., 2005). While the median of the capital reserves and the subscribed capital is 
relatively strong, high losses in the fields of net income/(loss) and net income/(loss) c.f. can be 
noted. This point also corresponds with findings from other studies and is typical for 
the first years of start-ups. Frequently, the balance sheets show losses not covered by equity, 
whereby over-indebtedness is reflected. This field is examined in the following section.  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
 
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
       
Year after foundation 593 3.24 3 1.97 1 9 
Fixed assets 593 365,608 27,754 2,283,710 0 45,462,809 
Intangible assets 435 131,253 9,581 333,884 0 2,938,378 
Tangible assets 435 31,255 4,884 79,443 0 755,504 
Financial assets 435 300,938 0 2,558,490 0 44,850,000 
Current assets 593 993,648 108,767 4,031,479 22 76.130,460 
Inventories 435 48,529 0 297,001 0 4,579,745 
Accounts receivable  435 707,042 42,066 2,615,547 0 27,651,807 
Securities 435 2,080 0 20,201 0 231,163 
Cash 435 521,695 69,272 2,508,287 0 48,192,352 
Prepaid expenses 593 18,446 375 155,924 0 2,851,870 
Other assets 593 714 0 7,614 0 120,788 
Equity 593 373,056 20,240 3,685,825 -20,393,735 63,491,239 
Subscribed capital 469 117,409 31,250 414,822 100 3,051,000 
Capital reserves 447 2,280,818 93,735 7,252,670 0 114,516,992 
Retained earnings  443 376 0 3,796 0 55,500 
Net income/(loss) c.f. 448 -1,111,147 -54,779 2,943,788 -23,509,506 3,418,863 
Net income/(loss) 443 -797,492 -85,842 2,193,754 -27,665,337 3,518,880 
Losses not covered by equity 593 229,898 0 1,251,951 0 20,393,735 
Debt capital 593 986,200 132,984 3,133,335 39 32,508,584 
Provisions  593 115,011 6,350 437,597 0 6,297,005 
Liabilities 593 842,865 102,861 2,881,341 0 31,276,275 
thereof: Current liabilities 464 638,083 61,916 2,417,257 0 31,276,275 
Deferred income 593 20,444 0 195,046 0 4,201,019 
Balance sheet total 593 1,359,256 184,079 5,328,634 105 92,770,629 
       
Notes: Absolute values based on full dataset. All data in Euro. 
 
Based on this overview across all years, Figure 2 shows the medians11 for each 
year after foundation for the main fields of the balance sheets. Whereas the intensity of 
current assets becomes apparent from the first year, the proportion of debt capital increases 
significantly over time. Particularly in the first years of a start-up, which are characterized 
by high growth, there is often a high degree of dependence on external investors. From 
the fourth year, the share of equity also increases significantly. One reason could be that 
the capital increases, for example through the admission of new shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
11 As measure of central tendency, the median is mainly used in this study, since it is much more robust 
against outliers compared to the arithmetic mean (Homburg, Klarmann, & Krohmer, 2009, p. 218). Thus, 
the median is a suitable measure for our examination of differently growing start-ups and consideration of 
different business years. 
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Figure 2: Development of selected balance sheet items over time [absolute values] 
 
 
Even if the absolute value of fixed assets rises over time, the relative share of 15-
20% remains relatively small. The growth of FinTech companies is reflected by the 
balance of total assets. Its median increases in the period of consideration from 50,000 
to 600,000 Euro. This corresponds to an average annual growth rate per year (CAGR) 
of 36%. 
 
B. Patterns in FinTech’s balance sheets 
As shown in the previous section, the balance sheets of FinTech start-ups are 
usually characterized by a very low equity ratio and high losses, especially in the initial 
periods. If the equity is completely used up by losses, the field losses not covered by equity 
has to be disclosed in the balance sheet in accordance with § 268 Para. 3 HGB. This field 
signals over-indebtedness of the company, which, however, does not necessarily entail 
an insolvency declaration. If a company has no balance sheet equity, certain conditions 
must be met in accordance with the insolvency law (§ 19 InsO, German Insolvency Act) 
for averting an insolvency declaration. In this section, the balance sheets of FinTech 
start-ups are differentiated according to whether such a field is listed or not (Table 6). 
Of the 593 recorded balance sheets, around one-third (206) show an uncovered deficit. 
While the median of the fixed assets does not differ between the two groups in terms of 
amount, the balance sheets that disclose a deficit show a low intensity of current assets. 
This is due to a lower amount of accounts receivable, but above all due to lower cash 
equivalents. The balance sheets without uncovered deficit show a three-times higher 
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median in the variable cash. This higher liquidity is accompanied by a fast adaptability, 
which makes it possible to react more flexibly to employment fluctuations, for instance. 
 
Table 6: Classification according to the disclosure of uncovered losses 
Assets Equity and liabilities 
 Losses not covered by 
equity 
 Losses not covered by 
equity 
 Yes No  Yes No 
      
Fixed Assets 28,673 26,975 Equity -99,915 87,914 
Intangible Assets 8,542 9,734 Subscribed capital 25,000 33,929 
Tangible Assets 3,648 5,530 Capital reserves 0 199,853 
Financial Assets 0 0 Retained earnings  0 0 
   Net income/(loss) c.f. -129,770 -16,434 
   Net income/(loss) -134,089 -41,853 
      
Current Assets 69,391 150,559 Debt capital 257,822 86,836 
Inventories 0 0 Provisions 6,325 6,400 
Accounts receivable 38,539 43,676 Liabilities 248,224 55,286 
Securities 0 0 Thereof: Current Liabilities 85,387 55,052 
Cash  29,970 106,786 Deferred income 0 0 
Prepaid expenses 671 230    
      
Balance sheet total 130,526 261,417 Balance sheet total 130,526 261,417 
Notes: All data are medians of the absolute values in Euro. 
 
On the equity and liability side, it becomes clear how the available equity is used 
up. For one thing, FinTech companies with a deficit in most cases have no capital reserves, 
which can be generated through the entry of investors, for example. Furthermore, high 
losses are registered, which are not covered by enough capital, resulting in over-
indebtedness. In case of FinTech companies without deficit, the losses are significantly 
lower and can be offset by the existing capital reserves. The fields of the liabilities in the 
balance sheets of the two groups also differ significantly. Thus, the median of the balance 
sheets with deficit is about four times as high. 
If these two identified balance sheet patterns are considered over time (Table 7), 
it is noticeable that the proportional distribution does not change significantly. For 
example, the share of balance sheets with deficit varies around 30% per year. However, 
it is not always the same companies that report such a deficit over time. Rather, there is 
often an exchange between these two balance sheet patterns, especially within the first 
few years. For example, around a quarter of the companies (23.66%) that have not 
reported a deficit in the first year disclose such a shortfall in the second year after 
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foundation. In contrast, one-third (34.21%) of FinTech companies that have reported a 
deficit in the first year could avoid the disclosure of over-indebtedness in the second 
year. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of uncovered losses and switching rates 
 Losses not covered 
by equity 
Change of this  
balance sheet pattern 
 
Yes No No → Yes Yes → No 
Years after 
foundation 
Share in % 
(number of firms) 
Share in % 
(number of firms) 
Share in % 
(number of firms) 
Share in % 
(number of firms)  
t1 29.01% (38) 70.99% (93)       -   -      -   - 
t2 34.15% (42) 65.85% (81) 23.66% (22) 34.21% (13) 
t3 39.09% (43) 60.91% (67) 19.75% (16) 19.05% (8) 
t4 43.33% (39) 56.67% (51) 17.91% (12) 18.60% (8) 
t5 35.09% (20) 64.91% (37) 3.92% (2) 7.69% (3) 
t6 21.62% (8) 78.38% (29) 2.70% (1) 5.00% (1) 
t7 34.78% (8) 65.22% (15) 13.79% (4) 12.50% (1) 
t8 33.33% (4) 66.67% (8) 6.67% (1)   25.00% (2) 
t9 40.00% (4) 60.00% (6) 25.00% (2) 25.00% (1) 
 
Over the course of time, a frequent exchange between the two balance sheet 
patterns can be determined in the first four years. From the fifth year, the exchange rates 
are usually in the single-digit percentage range. This analysis reveals that many FinTech 
companies report over-indebtedness in individual periods in the first years, which are 
characterized by high initial losses. From the fifth year, the financial situation 
consolidates, for example through increase in revenues or the entry of investors. If start-
ups continue to report over-indebtedness, their insolvency and failure are likely. Such 
failed start-ups and their characteristics are examined in comparison with still active 
companies in the following sections. 
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C. Empirical comparison of active and failed FinTech start-ups 
1. Classification of FinTech start-ups according to their activity status 
The purpose of further analysis is to examine how far balance sheet items of 
active FinTech start-ups differ in comparison to those FinTech companies that have 
already given up their business. The failed FinTech companies include those that have 
either filed for insolvency or whose liquidation has been registered in the Commercial 
Register (2017). This definition of a failure is in accordance with other studies, in which 
both insolvency declaration and liquidation define a failure (Maeschle, 2012). For 
recording the time of failure, the date of the insolvency declaration or the liquidation 
announcement in the Commercial Register was used.  
Our database includes a total of 109 active and 22 failed FinTech companies, 
which corresponds to a failure rate of 16.8%. This section examines whether certain 
balance sheet items of these two groups differ (significantly) from one another. 
Otherwise, it is shown which fields are already developing negatively before the complete 
failure compared to the industry average. In this way, fields can be identified on which 
special focus should be placed in the evaluation of FinTech start-ups with regard to their 
future prospects. Of the 22 considered FinTech start-ups that have already given up their 
business, the majority (87%) failed within three to six years after their foundation (Figure 
3). It is also striking that in the first two years after foundation, no failure is observed. 
After the peak in the fourth year, the failure rate decreases over time. Thus, the start-ups 
that could pass a certain stage seem to have a higher probability of continuation. 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of failed FinTechs over time 
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2. Median comparison 
Since the majority of FinTech start-ups fail within the first six years of their 
foundation, the focus of this section is on this period, which seems to be critical for the 
continuation of a FinTech company. A median comparison of the individual balance 
sheet items identifies those fields that show clear differences between the groups of 
active and failed start-ups. In order to evaluate statistically significant differences in the 
distribution between two independent samples and to examine individual fields of the 
balance sheet with regard to their univariate separability, the Mann-Whitney U-Test can 
be used. This test verifies that the two groups differ significantly in their distribution 
(Anderson, 2010, p. 740). The significant balance sheet items are labelled accordingly in 
Table 8 and 9. The medians of each balance sheet item are shown for the absolute values 
and for the respective relative shares of the balance sheet total, both over the entire 
period of observation as well as for each year after foundation separately. 
 
Table 8: Median comparison for variables of the asset side  
Variable Group 
Years after foundation 
t1- t6 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 
         
Fixed  
assets 
Active 
27,311** 
11.09% 
3,707 
6.32% 
18,405 
8.89% 
36,438 
12.45% 
38,899 
11.09% 
52,304 
16.71% 
65,187 
23.56% 
Failed 
18,577** 
17.37% 
1,673 
7.42% 
33,463 
23.79% 
18,893 
26.80% 
25,245 
17.42% 
41,411 
1.51% 
122,537 
41.27% 
         
Intangible  
assets 
Active 
8,222 
2.58% 
0 
0.00% 
6,690 
3.90% 
12,297 
3.23% 
15,212 
2.60% 
35,819 
3.70% 
36,529 
4.44% 
Failed 
21,883 
12.24% 
0 
0.00% 
20,750 
13.03% 
73,515 
20.98% 
119,032 
21.22% 
82,114 
39.76% 
232,450 
78.01% 
         
Tangible 
assets 
Active 
4,904** 
1.29% 
655 
0.55% 
3,648 
1.27% 
8,490 
1.88% 
11,716 
1.65% 
18,655 
1.54% 
28,204 
1.36% 
Failed 
1,166** 
0.78% 
0 
0.00% 
1,846 
3.41% 
3,779 
1.05% 
4,126 
1.95% 
1,774 
0.37% 
12,596 
4.23% 
         
Financial  
assets 
Active 
0** 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
Failed 
0** 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
         
Current  
assets 
Active 
125,252** 
88.91% 
38,845 
93.68% 
116,137** 
91.11% 
150,953** 
87.55% 
295,462** 
88.91% 
332,502 
83.29% 
524,980 
76.44% 
Failed 
25,468** 
82.63% 
25,677 
92.58% 
28,962** 
76.21% 
26,004** 
73.20% 
13,982** 
82.58% 
42,292 
98.49% 
30,788 
58.73% 
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Table 8: Median comparison for variables of the asset side (continued) 
Variable Group 
Years after foundation 
t1- t6 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 
         
Inventories 
Active 
0** 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
Failed 
0** 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
         
Accounts  
receivable 
Active 
42,300** 
18.38% 
7,725 
11.83% 
23,727 
17.83% 
81,027 
29.98% 
96,052 
29.81% 
121,562 
15.29% 
130,954 
13.57% 
Failed 
9,085** 
10.00% 
8,349 
11.31% 
3,644 
8.89% 
48,041 
11.88% 
8,723 
3.01% 
42,621 
50.74% 
24,487 
8.22% 
         
Cash 
Active 
78,841** 
42.69% 
25,045 
52.47% 
71,131 
43.28% 
89,437** 
35.05% 
144,076** 
41.36% 
182,738** 
45.07% 
324,905 
29.07% 
Failed 
10,220** 
22.01% 
11,843 
41.98% 
11,533 
55.37% 
10,288** 
10.42% 
255** 
0.13% 
3,185** 
4.32% 
25,421 
8.53% 
         
Prepaid  
expenses 
Active 
418** 
0.16% 
0 
0.00% 
391 
0.22% 
701 
0.20% 
1,013** 
0.18% 
3,259 
0.41% 
2,250 
0.22% 
Failed 
0** 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
198 
0.22% 
0 
0.00% 
0** 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
1,250 
0.42% 
         
         
Notes: Absolute values in Euro. The medians per balance sheet item are shown for the absolute values and for the 
respective relative shares scaled by the balance sheet total. For examining the significance for the univariate separability 
in absolute values, the Mann-Whitney U-Test was conducted at a significance level of 5%. The variable securities was 
eliminated because no significant disparity was detected, and all values were zero. Significant disparities of the two 
groups at a significance level of 5% are marked with **. 
 
Regarding the asset side, many significant differences are found for the entire 
period of observation, while for the separate years after foundation the picture is more 
fragmented (Table 8). Across all years, there are significant disparities regarding fixed and 
current assets. While failed FinTechs show a slightly higher intensity of fixed assets, they 
exhibit significantly lower values in terms of absolute values in comparison to active 
FinTechs. Concerning the current assets, the medians of active FinTech companies, with 
125,252 Euro, are five times higher. This can be attributed to higher accounts receivable 
ratio and a significantly higher proportion of cash in case of active start-ups. The higher 
intensity of fixed assets, coupled with a relatively small amount of cash equivalents of failed 
FinTech companies, expresses high values of fixed cost and long-term capital 
commitment. If, for example, sales fluctuations or other unforeseen events occur, this 
leads to a lower cost flexibility as well as adaptability than in the case of active FinTech 
companies. By regarding the individual years after foundation, it becomes clear that there 
are significant differences between failed and active FinTech companies, especially in the 
third to fifth year after foundation, although the two groups do not differ significantly 
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in the year of their foundation. Significant disparities become particularly apparent in the 
fields of current assets and cash. Here, both groups differ significantly in the second to fifth 
year, in which active FinTechs show higher amounts - both relative as well absolute. 
 
Table 9: Median comparison for variables of the equity and liability side 
Variable Group 
Years after foundation 
t1- t6 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 
         
Equity 
Active 
23,877** 
30.36% 
14,035 
46.59% 
18,314 
23.53% 
24,348 
14.45% 
25,000** 
21.87% 
85,949 
32.52% 
168,823 
56.73% 
Failed 
7,751** 
34.75% 
16,628 
74.66% 
13,584 
34.41% 
4,356 
31.29% 
-7,521** 
-40.02% 
-214,669 
-125.49% 
-208,800 
-58.45% 
         
Subscribed  
capital 
Active 
31,250 
15.70% 
25,000 
50.44% 
30,000 
13.20% 
36,000 
13.33% 
40,048 
11.23% 
44,772 
9.03% 
50,000 
6.38% 
Failed 
25,200 
36.33% 
25,000 
97.37% 
27,500 
47.71% 
28,408 
26.30% 
26,704 
11.54% 
26,704 
14.24% 
45,556 
15.29% 
         
Capital  
reserves 
Active 
81,471 
36.44% 
0 
0.00% 
35,889 
27.77% 
200,000 
105.00% 
229,707 
111.45% 
403,614 
166.39% 
2,055,184 
249.85% 
Failed 
22,000 
27.92% 
0 
0.00% 
110,544 
81.87% 
110,544 
106.04% 
11,000 
13.83% 
140,883 
18.51% 
1,832,392 
614.94% 
         
Net income/ 
(loss) c.f. 
Active 
-41,719 
-15.18% 
0 
0.00% 
-22,215 
-12.04% 
-139,513 
-49.62% 
-221,974 
-116.31% 
-354,412 
-95.38% 
-1,234,028 
-153.84% 
Failed 
-23,754 
-16.80% 
0 
0.00% 
-23,425 
-28.50% 
-197,298 
-249.84% 
-306,338 
-155.86% 
-319,504 
-176.67% 
-381,957 
-128.18% 
         
Net income/ 
(loss) 
Active 
-94,222 
-46.26% 
-20,936 
-37.73% 
-100,198 
-76.99% 
-152,152 
-53.96% 
-243,094 
-39.68% 
-138,594 
-37.20% 
-455,273 
-36.28% 
Failed 
-61,295 
-54.81% 
-19,899 
-32.10% 
-102,790 
-112.66% 
-74,866 
-59.31% 
-99,729 
-53.14% 
-43,518 
-26.49% 
-1,915,667 
-642.88% 
         
Losses not  
covered by equity 
Active 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
Failed 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
7,521 
64.93% 
214,669 
130.69% 
209,838 
70.42% 
         
Debt capital 
Active 
134,049** 
69.64% 
26,946 
53.41% 
109,359 
76.47% 
208,212** 
85.55% 
299,808 
78.13% 
334,242 
67.48% 
345,989 
43.27% 
Failed 
47,830** 
65.25% 
11,645 
25.34% 
55,133 
65.59% 
65,986** 
68.71% 
69,689 
140.02% 
504,182 
225.49% 
362,124 
158.45% 
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Table 9: Median comparison for variables of the equity and liability side (continued) 
Variable Group 
Years after foundation 
t1- t6 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 
         
Provisions 
Active 
6,746** 
5.05% 
2,100 
3.99% 
5,458 
6.37% 
8,011** 
5.33% 
14,807** 
5.21% 
19,640 
5.24% 
55,929 
4.87% 
Failed 
2,500** 
5.87% 
1,089 
3.81% 
2,575 
4.82% 
3,325** 
5.71% 
3,500** 
9.60% 
8,094 
11.69% 
19,005 
18.70% 
         
Liabilities 
Active 
109,202** 
54.32% 
21,560 
30.76% 
83,004 
65.05% 
135,390** 
59.12% 
196,293 
67.22% 
227,880 
46.93% 
273,560 
34.23% 
Failed 
43,010** 
50.67% 
10,738 
21.55% 
45,101 
51.69% 
61,027** 
47.38% 
56,934 
133.72% 
477,535 
213.58% 
343,119 
139.75% 
         
Current  
Liabilities 
Active 
71,101** 
27.82% 
13,567 
23.73% 
39,697 
26.70% 
87,690** 
33.85% 
125,710 
27.78% 
196,419 
30.84% 
163,125 
25.98% 
Failed 
22,235** 
27.15% 
10,000 
11.50% 
22,235 
23.36% 
36,441** 
34.20% 
25,093 
93.28% 
722,519 
38.68% 
559,190 
187.66% 
         
Balance sheet  
total 
Active 
197,210** 
100.00% 
52,327 
100.00% 
180,544 
100.00% 
281,747** 
100.00% 
475,609** 
100.00% 
525,428 
100.00% 
723,979 
100.00% 
Failed 
59,808** 
100.00% 
42,090 
100.00% 
68,820 
100.00% 
64,981** 
100.00% 
44,374** 
100.00% 
164,253 
100.00% 
153,324 
100.00% 
         
Notes: Absolute values in Euro. The medians per balance sheet item are shown for the absolute values and for the 
respective relative shares scaled by the balance sheet total. For examining the significance for the univariate separability 
in absolute values, the Mann-Whitney U-Test was conducted at a significance level of 5%. The variables retained earnings 
and deferred income were eliminated because no significant disparity was detected, and all values were zero. Significant 
disparities of the two groups at a significance level of 5% are marked with **. 
 
Looking at the equity and liability side of the balance sheet (Table 9), the picture 
is similar to the asset side, with significant differences in the whole period as well as in 
the third to fourth year after foundation. Thus, the group of active FinTech companies 
show significantly higher amounts for equity as well as debt capital for both individual years 
and the entire period. The equity of failed FinTechs decreases significantly over the 
individual years. This development also becomes apparent regarding the variable of losses 
not covered by equity, which occurs since the fourth year in case of failed companies. There 
are also significant differences by provisions and liabilities, which are explicitly higher for 
active FinTech companies. Looking at the balance sheet total, active FinTech companies 
show higher values. The absolute difference between them and the failed FinTech 
companies increases each year, which can be used as an indicator of significantly higher 
company growth. The average annual growth rate for the total assets of active FinTech 
companies is 55%, which is more than twice as high as for failed FinTechs (25%). 
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Overall, it can be concluded from the median comparison that the groups of 
failed and active FinTech companies differ significantly in individual items of the balance 
sheet. Differences are particularly observable in the third to fifth year after foundation, 
which could be identified as the critical period for continuation. 
 
3. Analysis of the failure date 
This section focusses on the development of individual balance sheet items in 
the period prior to the failure of a FinTech company. It is evaluated how long before the 
failure changes in selected balance sheet items become visible. For this purpose, the 
course of individual balance sheet figures of failed companies for a period of three years 
prior to the failure t0 is shown. As a comparison group, the medians of the corresponding 
figures of the active FinTechs in the first six years are presented. In the previous section, 
significant differences in debt capital between the two groups become apparent. While 
three years before failure (Figure 4), the failed FinTech companies still have a 
significantly lower debt ratio than the active FinTech companies, the ratio of debt capital 
and liabilities exceeds the values of the comparison group one to two years before failure. 
These values continue to increase up to the failure date. This development is mainly 
attributable to the increase in the uncovered deficit, which also rises significantly two 
years before the failure. 
 
Figure 4: Development of selected items of the equity and liability side in the period before failure t0 
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Regarding the asset side (Figure 5), differences become visible especially in the 
development of the share of fixed and intangible assets. On average, the median of the fixed 
asset shares for the group of active FinTech start-ups is around 11%, while it is twice as 
high for failed FinTech companies three years before the failure date, at around 21%. 
Only one year before failure, the share of fixed assets falls below the level of 11%. The 
proportion of intangible assets, which is still relatively strong three years before failure, 
behaves similarly. It declines significantly from this date. Thus, on the asset side, the one 
or two years before failure can be identified as the years in which remarkable changes in 
balance sheet items of failed FinTech companies are observable. 
 
Figure 5: Development of selected items of the asset side in the period before failure t0 
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also shows a negative coefficient and a statistically significant relation. Thus, when a 
FinTech has accumulated a higher level of these fixed assets, the probability of being 
assigned to the group of failed companies decreases. Depending on the area of activity 
of the FinTech, high initial investments are necessary for fixed assets, but if this phase can 
be overcome successfully, the probability of failure declines. The next two variables 
accounts receivable and cash, as positions of the current assets, show the same type of 
relationship, which also corresponds with our previous results, wherein the values of 
active start-ups were strongly pronounced in these fields. The higher is the ratio of these 
balance sheet items, the lower is the probability of failure.  
 
Table 10: Results of the logistic regression 
Dependent variable: Firm Failure with y=0 (active) and y=1 (failed) 
Independent variables Coeff. p-value 
Robust 
Std. error 
VIF 
     
INTERCEPT 0.579 0.231 0.483 - 
TANGIBLE ASSETS -7.250** 0.026 3.249 1.391 
ACCOUNTS REVEIVABLE -1.779** 0.024 0.789 1.544 
CASH -2.205*** 0.000 0.594 1.613 
NET INCOME/(LOSS) C.F. -0.175*** 0.001 0.053 1.487 
NET INCOME/(LOSS) -0.318*** 0.006 0.117 1.732 
PROVISIONS -5.165*** 0.002 1.704 1.423 
YEAR AFTER FOUNDATION -0.424*** 0.000 0.114 1.113 
   
n  417 
Wald Χ²  33.4  
Prob. > Χ²  0.0000 
Nagelkerke R²  0.234 
     
Notes: 417 of the 593 observations in our sample were used to estimate the model. The not considered cases were 
not included due to missing data for at least one of the variables. The whole model shows a Nagelkerke Pseudo R² of 
over 0.2, which is regarded as acceptable. Before we performed the logistic regression, our sample was checked for 
outliers. No observations were detected that deviate more than three standard deviations from the mean. The last 
column displays the VIF of the respective predictors for addressing the condition of no multicollinearity. Since the 
value of the VIF is clearly below ten for all variables, the requirement of absence of multicollinearity is fulfilled. 
Coefficients that are significant at the 5%/1% level are labeled with **/***. 
 
Another statistically significant impact with negative coefficients is revealed by 
our model in the items net income/(loss) and net income/(loss) c.f.. If a FinTech has already 
made profits, this has a positive impact on its survival prospects. The provisions ratio is 
also highly significant. As already mentioned, the field of the provisions is very low, 
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especially in the initial years. As the proportion of provisions increases, our model assumes 
that the failure probability of a FinTech decreases. This finding corresponds with our 
expectations, since companies that are on the brink of insolvency pay less attention to 
accumulating high reserves in their balance sheet. 
We were able to identify the balance sheet ratios that significantly influence the 
probability of failure and therefore are of high interest to the valuation of FinTech 
companies by means of this regression model. It is also clear that fields such as losses not 
covered by equity do not make significant statements about the continuation of a FinTech 
company. Generated losses can be compensated by receiving capital from outside 
creditors, for instance, so that the declaration of uncovered losses can be omitted. 
Rather, it is important to observe the annual net income, which reflects the development 
of actually sold products or services and the performance in the fiscal year.  
For assessing the results of the logistic regression in terms of classification of 
performance and separability of the two groups, the resulting ROC curve for our 
determined regression model is shown in Figure 6. Our model has an AUC value of 
78.74%, which is considered to be very good in literature; thus, our model reveals a 
suitable separation between the groups of active and failed FinTech companies. 
 
Figure 6: ROC curve based on the probabilities resulting from the conducted logistic regression 
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V. Conclusion 
In this paper, an analysis of annual accounts of FinTech start-ups is carried out 
in order to present specific features of balance sheets of FinTech companies and identify 
balance sheet ratios that influence the probability of failure. First of all, the legal 
implications that have to be taken into account in the balance sheet analysis of FinTech 
companies as well as start-ups in general and their impact on the available data are 
highlighted. We subsequently show that balance sheets of FinTech companies are 
fundamentally characterized by the high intensity of current assets as well as debt capital and 
an uncovered deficit is often disclosed, especially in the initial business years. Such over-
indebtedness is often attributable to high losses and lack of capital reserves, for instance 
through investors. We also show that the balance sheets of failed and active FinTech 
companies differ significantly in terms of some balance sheet fields. We could identify 
the third to fifth year after foundation as the critical period for the future survival 
prospects of FinTechs, which is revealed by both the median comparison and the 
consideration of failure rates over time. Furthermore, active FinTech companies 
generally have higher equity, higher current assets, and higher liquidity, which leads to higher 
responsiveness to employment fluctuations, for example. Finally, we evaluate those 
balance sheet ratios that have a significant impact on the probability of failure and have 
a good ability to separate the groups of active and failed FinTech companies. This 
includes the intensity of tangible assets, accounts receivable, and cash on the asset side and the 
net income/(loss), net income/(loss) c.f., and provisions on the equity and liability side. The more 
these fields are pronounced in the balance sheets, the lower is the probability of failure. 
Thus, FinTechs that have overcome the initial phase by building fixed assets and high 
liquidity, making profits, and building up provisions can be assigned a higher probability 
of survival according to our logistic regression model.  
The research conducted, and the results presented in this paper are relevant both 
theoretically and practically. The illustrated proportions of balance sheet items and the 
particularities of FinTech companies have initially created a better understanding and 
transparency, which can be used for both sides in the further analyses and evaluation of 
FinTech start-ups. In addition, the balance sheet ratios were identified through median 
comparison and regression analysis, which act as a significant indicator of the failure 
probability of FinTech start-ups. For example, investors searching for investment 
decisions or companies assessing acquisition objects can focus more on these key figures. 
The results are also of interest for the regulatory authorities who observe the FinTech 
development and have to manage the tradeoff between the ongoing technological 
change and the associated risks. Countries like Germany have to search for new 
regulatory approaches to control the risk associated with the FinTech business and to 
ensure financial stability. Likewise, the results are also important for the theory. Thus, 
the insights generated in this article can be used to compare start-ups from other 
industries with the FinTech segment, for example. Furthermore, the structure and special 
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characteristics of FinTechs’ balance sheets are shown, so that further research works can 
use our findings as a basis.  
When considering the examinations and results presented in this article, some 
limitations must be considered. On the one hand, the examined FinTech companies are 
only a sample. As shown, some start-ups could not be considered due to unpublished 
data. Likewise, there is no guarantee that all FinTech start-ups that were active in 
Germany at the time of the investigation have been taken into account. One possible 
reason is, for instance, such FinTech companies that are still in the so-called “stealth-
mode” and not yet active or visible in the market. On the other hand, there are limitations 
due to the availability of data, as explained in previous sections in detail. Only certain 
financial measures could be included in the investigation due to the legal relaxations 
regarding the disclosure obligations and the extent of disclosures. In light of the missing 
profit-and-loss statements that are not accessible to third parties, no detailed conclusions 
can be drawn e.g. about sales indicators. Finally, the past-orientation of the annual 
financial data is a limitation, since ultimately only data up to 2016 could be taken into 
account. Overall, the research carried out in this paper provides impulses for further 
research efforts. Here, for instance, it would be suitable to repeat the analysis if other 
failed FinTech companies can be included and if more annual financial data are available. 
Also, a comparison with other start-up segments or even established firms could be a 
research motivation. Similarly, a comparison with conventional indicator catalogues 
from other rating models could be appropriate to assess which specific features play a 
role in the evaluation of FinTech start-ups in particular. Furthermore, it could be of great 
interest to further investigate the failed FinTech start-ups with respect to the specific 
business field of the FinTech segment (e.g. payment), the applied business models, and 
the product solutions. In this way, regulatory authorities, for instance, can gain an 
overview of the sub-segments of the FinTech area with a higher risk of failure. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Altman, E. I., & Narayanan, P. (1997). An international survey of business failure 
classification models. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 6(2), 1–
57. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0416.00010  
Altman, E. I., & Saunders, A. (1997). Credit risk measurement: Developments over the 
last 20 years. Journal of Banking & Finance, 21(11-12), 1721–1742. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(97)00036-8  
Stuckenborg & Leker - The survival of the German FinTech market 
 
88 88 
Anandarajan, A., Francis, B., Hasan, I., & John, K. (2011). Value relevance of banks: 
Global evidence. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 36(1), 33–55. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-010-0170-7  
Anderson, D. R. (2010). Statistics for business and economics (2nd ed.). Andover: South-
Western Cengage Learning. 
Arner, D. W., Barberis, J. N., & Buckey, R. P. (2017). FinTech, RegTech, and the 
reconceptualization of financial regulation. Northwestern Journal of 
International Law Business, 37(3), 371–414. 
Backhaus, K., Erichson, B., Plinke, W., & Weiber, R. (2016). Multivariate 
Analysemethoden (14th ed.). Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Gabler. 
Baetge, J. (1998). Bilanzanalyse. Duesseldorf: IDW. 
Barth, T., Barth, D., Nassadil, J., & Werner, F. (2014). Jahresabschlussanalyse mit 
Bilanzkennzahlen. Konstanz: UVK. 
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1998). The economics of small business finance: The roles 
of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 22(6-8), 613–673. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-
4266(98)00038-7  
Broesel, G. (2017). Bilanzanalyse (16th ed.). Berlin: Erich Schmidt. 
Brummer, C., & Gorfine, D. (2014). FinTech: Building a 21st century regulator’s toolkit. 
Santa Monica: Milken Institute. 
Business Register. (2017). The central platform for the storage of company data. 
Retrieved from http://www.unternehmensregister.de [Aug 31, 2017]. 
Commercial Register. (2017). Common register portal of the German federal states. 
Retrieved from http://www.handelsregister.de [Aug 31, 2017]. 
Crunchbase. (2017). Crunchbase data exports. Retrieved from 
http://www.crunchbase.com [Aug 31, 2017]. 
D'Avino, M., Simone, V. de, Iannucci, M., & Schiraldi, M. M. (2015). Guidelines for e-
startup promotion strategy. Journal of Technology Management & Innovation, 
10(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.4067/S0718-27242015000100001  
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance    Volume 21   Issue 1     2019   
 
 
89 
Diehm, J. (2014). Controlling in Start-up-Unternehmen. Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Dorfleitner, G., Hornuf, L., Schmitt, M., & Weber, M. (2017). FinTech in Germany. 
Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
Duvivier, A. (2000). Financing and risks of internet start-ups: A preliminary assessment. 
Banque de France paper. 
Ernst and Young. (2017). Germany FinTech landscape. Retrieved from 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-germany-fin-tech-landscape-
2017/$FILE/ey-germany-fin-tech-landscape.pdf [Jan 07, 2018]. 
Federal Gazette. (2017). Publication Platform. Retrieved from 
http://www.bundesanzeiger.de [Aug 31, 2017]. 
Fischer, A. (2012). Entwicklung eines länderübergreifenden Bilanzratingmodells. 
Lohmar: Eul. 
Gaskill, L. R., van Auken, H. E., & Manning, R. A. (1993). A factor analytic study of the 
perceived causes of small business failure. Journal of Small Business 
Management, 31(4), 18–31. 
Ge, W., & Whitmore, G. A. (2010). Binary response and logistic regression in recent 
accounting research publications: A methodological note. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 34(1), 81–93. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-009-0123-1  
Google Scholar. (2018). About Google Scholar. Retrieved from 
https://scholar.google.com/intl/de/scholar/about.html [Aug 31, 2018]. 
Graefer, H., & Schneider, G. (2010). Bilanzanalyse: Traditionelle Kennzahlenanalyse des 
Einzeljahresabschlusses (11th ed.). NWB-Studium. Herne: nwb. 
Gregory, B. T., Rutherford, M. W., Oswald, S., & Gardiner, L. (2005). An empirical 
investigation of the growth cycle theory of small firm financing. Journal of Small 
Business Management, 43(4), 382–392. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
627X.2005.00143.x  
Gulamhuseinwala, I., Bull, T., & Lewis, S. (2015). FinTech is gaining traction and young, 
high-income users are the early adopters. Journal of Financial Perspectives, 3(3), 
16–23. 
Stuckenborg & Leker - The survival of the German FinTech market 
 
90 90 
Hair, J. F., Black, B., Babin, B., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006). Multivariate 
data analysis (6th ed.). Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall. 
Homburg, C., Klarmann, M., & Krohmer, H. (2009). Statistische Grundlagen der 
Datenanalyse. In A. Herrmann, C. Homburg, & M. Klarmann (Eds.), Handbuch 
Marktforschung (3rd ed., pp. 213–240). Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler. 
Huynh, K. P., Petrunia, R. J., & Voia, M. C. (2010). The impact of initial financial state 
on firm duration across entry cohorts. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 
58(3), 661–689. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00429.x  
Insolvency Announcements. (2017). Publication platform of the Federal Ministry for 
Justice of North Rhine Westphalia, Germany. Retrieved from 
https://www.insolvenzbekanntmachungen.de/ [Aug 31, 2017]. 
Kashyap, M., Shipman, J., Garfinkel, H., Davies, S., & Nicolacakis, D. (2017). Global 
FinTech report 2017. Retrieved from https://www.pwc.com/jg/en/ 
publications/pwc-global-fintech-report-17.3.17-final.pdf [Jan 07, 2018]. 
Kiem, R., Potel, G., Trillmich, P., & Weir, G. (2016). FinTech M&A: From threat to 
opportunity. Retrieved from https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/ 
files/files/download/publications/fintech-mergers-acquisitions-from-threat-to-
opportunity.pdf [Jan 07, 2018]. 
KPMG. (2017). The pulse of FinTech Q3 2017. Retrieved from 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/11/pulse-of-
fintech-q3-17.pdf [Jan 07, 2018]. 
Krueger, G. H. (2014). Jahresabschlussanalyse in KMU. Herne: nwb. 
Kueting, P., & Weber, C.-P. (2015). Die Bilanzanalyse: Beurteilung von Abschlüssen 
nach HGB und IFRS (11th ed.): Schaeffer-Poeschel. 
Kuhn, M., & Johnson, K. (2013). Applied predictive modeling. New York: Springer. 
Lachnit, L., & Mueller, S. (2017). Bilanzanalyse (2nd ed.). Wiesbaden: Springer. 
Lim, C. Y., Ding, D. K., & Charoenwong, C. (2013). Non-audit fees, institutional 
monitoring, and audit quality. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 
41(2), 343–384. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-012-0312-1  
The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance    Volume 21   Issue 1     2019   
 
 
91 
Maeschle, O. (2012). Which information should entrepreneurs on German 
crowdinvesting-platforms disclose? Thünen-Series of Applied Economic 
Theory, Working Paper No. 127. 
Marom, S., & Lussier, R. N. (2014). A business success versus failure prediction model 
for small businesses in Israel. Business and Economic Research, 4(2), 63–81. 
https://doi.org/10.5296/ber.v4i2.5997  
Nicolini, H. J. (2008). Jahresabschlussanalyse (3rd ed.). Muenchen: Beck. 
PaymentandBanking. (2017). Data exports. Retrieved from 
http://www.paymentandbanking.com [Aug 31, 2017]. 
Pospeschill, M. (2010). Testtheorie, Testkonstruktion, Testevaluation. Muenchen, Basel: 
Ernst Reinhardt. 
Raeth, G. (2017). Insolvency announcement of Cashboard. Retrieved from 
https://www.gruenderszene.de/allgemein/cashboard-meldet-insolvenz-an-wir-
sind-auf-den-letzten-metern-gescheitert [Jan 07, 2018]. 
Rheinboldt, R. (1998). Analyse von Konzernabschlüssen mit Hilfe von Kennzahlen. 
Lohmar: Eul. 
Stuckenborg, L., Klein, J., & Leker, J. (2017). FinTech start-ups: How do business model, 
area of activity and revenue model relate? A study of the German market. 
Corporate Finance. (09-10), 257–268. 
Swisscom. (2017). Swisscom launches Open Banking Hub. Retrieved from 
https://www.swisscom.ch/content/dam/swisscom/en/about/media/fact-
check/documents/2017/20171106-fc-swisscom-launches-open-banking-hub-
en.pdf.res/20171106-fc-swisscom-launches-open-banking-hub-en.pdf [Jan 07, 
2018]. 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston: 
Pearson/Allyn and Bacon. 
Temelkov, Z. (2018). Fintech firms opportunity or threat for banks? International 
Journal of Information, Business and Management, 10(1), 138–144. 
Theile, C. (2017). Jahresabschluss der Klein- und Kleinstkapitalgesellschaften (2nd ed.). 
Herne: nwb. 
Stuckenborg & Leker - The survival of the German FinTech market 
 
92 92 
Thomas, L. C. (2009). Consumer credit models: Oxford University Press. 
Thornton-Trump, A. B., & Fu, W. (2000). Small business modeling within the financial 
accounting conceptual framework. Data Mining 2, 35–43. 
Winnefeld, C. H., & Permantier, A. (2017). FinTech - The digital (r)evolution in the 
German banking sector? Business and Management Research, 6(3), 65–84. 
https://doi.org/10.5430/bmr.v6n3p65  
Wolff, J. (2017). Insolvency announcement of Outbank. Retrieved from 
https://www.gruenderszene.de/allgemein/banking-startup-outbank-
insolvenzantrag [Jan 07, 2018]. 
Wright, M., Lumpkin, T., Zott, C., & Agarwal, R. (2016). The evolving entrepreneurial 
finance landscape. Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 10(3), 229–234. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/sej.1232  
Zavgren, C. V. (1985). Assessing the vulnerability to failure of American industrial firms: 
A logistic analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 12(1), 19–45. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1985.tb00077.x  
Zavolokina, L., Dolata, M., & Schwabe, G. (2016). FinTech - What's in a name: A logistic 
analysis. Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems 
Dublin 2016. 
ZEB. (2017). FinTech Profiles. Retrieved from https://www.fintech-
hub.eu/searchprofiles [Aug 31, 2017]. 
 
